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ABSTRACT: Developing effective partnerships between the UN and Regional organizations 
involved in the delivery of Peace-keeping Operations (PKOs) has become a key element to improve 
the effectiveness, credibility and sustainability of these missions. The recent trend of transferring 
authority from a regional Organization to a UN PKO represents an interesting tool based on the 
principles of complementarity and comparative advantages. At the request of the Security Council, 
the UN Secretary General carried out a lessons-learned exercise on the transition from African 
Union peace operations to UN PKOs in Mali and in the Central African Republic (CAR). This 
article provides a critical analysis of this Report and argues that a smooth transition phase from 
one operation to the other is possible provided that a set of conditions are fulfilled. Moreover, the 
present contribution highlights that the two cases offer interesting lessons to be learned, which 
could prove to be essential for the future transition from the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) to a UN operation.
KEY WORDS: UN, Regional organizations, Peace-keeping, Partnerships.
DEVELOPPER UN PARTENARIAT EFFICACE ENTRE L’ONU ET LES ORGANISATIONS 
REGIONAUX DANS LE DOMAINE DES OPERATIONS DE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX. LE 
DERNIER RAPPORT DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL DES NU SUR LA TRANSITION AU 
MALI ET EN REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE.
RÉSUMÉ : Développer des partenariats efficaces entre l’ONU et les Organisations régionales 
engagées dans le déploiement des Opérations de maintien de la paix (OMP) est devenue un élément 
1 Full Professor of  Public International Law. Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Piazza Martiri della 
Libertà, 33 56127 PISA, ITALY. <deguttry@sssup.it>.
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clé pour améliorer l’efficacité, la crédibilité et la durabilité de ces missions. La récente pratique 
de transférer l’autorité d’une mission de maintien de la paix du niveau régional au niveau de 
l’ONU représente un outil intéressant basé sur les principes de complémentarité et de l’avantage 
comparatif. À la requête du Conseil de sécurité, le Secrétaire général de l’ONU a réalisé un étude 
sur les leçons apprises concernant l’attribution des opérations de maintien de la paix au Mali et en 
République centrafricaine de l’Union africaine aux Nations Unies. Cet article propose une analyse 
critique de ce Rapport et va démontrer que une phase de transition « douce » entre une opération à 
l’autre est possible si des conditions spécifiques se réalisent. En plus, cet écrit va montrer que les 
deux opérations offrent des intéressantes leçons à tirer, qui pourraient se révéler utiles hors de la 
transition de la Mission de Paix de l’Union Africaine en Somalie (AMISOM) aux Nations Unies. 
MOT CLES: ONU, Organisations Régionaux, Maintien de la paix, Partenariats 
DESARROLLAR UNA COLABORACIÓN EFICAZ EN LAS OPERACIONES 
DE MANTENIMIENTO DE LA PAZENTRE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS Y LAS 
ORGANIZACIONES REGIONALES. UN INFORME RECIENTE DEL SECRETARIO 
GENERAL DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS SOBRE LA TRANSICIÓN EN MALI Y EN LA 
REPÚBLICA CENTROAFRICANA
RESUMEN: Desarrollar una colaboración eficaz entre las Naciones Unidas y las Organizaciones 
Regionales involucradas en la realización de Operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz (OMP) se 
ha convertido en un elemento clave para mejorar la eficacia, la credibilidad y la sostenibilidad 
de estas misiones. La tendencia reciente de transferencia de autoridad desde una Organización 
Regional a una OMP de las Naciones Unidas representa un instrumento interesante basado en 
los principios de la complementariedad y de las ventajas comparadas. A petición del Consejo de 
Seguridad, el Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas ha llevado a cabo un ejercicio de lecciones 
aprendidas sobre la transición de las operaciones de paz de la Unión Africana para las OMP de 
las Naciones Unidas en Mali y en la República Centroafricana. Este artículo ofrece un análisis 
crítico de este Informe y argumenta que una fase de transición suave de una operación a la otra es 
posible a condición de que un conjunto de condiciones se cumpla. Además, la presente contribución 
evidencia que los dos casos ofrecen lecciones interesantes que pueden ser aprendidas y que podrían 
ser esenciales para la transición futura de la Misión de la Unión Africana en Somalia (AMISOM) 
para una operación de las Naciones Unidas.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Naciones Unidas, Organizaciones Regionales, Mantenimiento de la Paz, 
Colaboración
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades PKOs have undergone major changes, as is evident from 
the large number of  contributions published in this Journal. One of  the significant 
innovations which has occurred is related to the actors involved in delivering these 
kinds of  field operations. While in the past the UN, who rightly claims to have 
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invented them, enjoyed a de facto monopoly in organizing PKOs, in more recent 
times regional Organizations, coalitions of  the willing, groups of  States and even 
individual States have entered this “market” and started to offer their services. This 
new situation should not come as a surprise: in 1945 the drafter of  the UN Charter 
in San Francisco introduced a specific rule, namely Article 52, in which the role of  
regional organizations in dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of  
international peace and security was not only predicted but even welcomed.2 The 
increasing activism of  different players interested in delivering PKO’s, especially 
in the African continent,3 has even provoked a kind of  latent competition between 
these actors, entailing positive as well as negative effects. On the one hand this 
competition has stimulated all the actors to improve the quality of  their services, 
while on the other hand it has resulted in a trend of  only calling in the UN in 
situations where other parties are reluctant to become involved with a given region/
area.
In more recent times the various PKO providers seem to have changed their 
attitude from one of  “competition” to one of  “cooperation”. Various forms of  
cooperation between the UN and regional organizations and/or coalitions of  the 
willing have already been carefully examined by several scholars.4  One issue that has 
received a lot of  attention recently is the “transition phase” from a PKO carried out 
by regional organizations to the UN and vice versa.  International practice, especially 
in the African continent,5  demonstrates that these transition phases are becoming 
popular and that the manner in which they are carried out has a decisive impact on the 
effectiveness of  the operations. Two recent cases confirm this thesis: the transition 
from the African-led peace operations to the UN PKOs in Mali and in Central Africa 
Republic. Both cases presented complex challenges to the two institutions involved 
and raised sensitive issues: this is why the SC requested in its Resolution 2167(2014) 
2 For more on this, see WAlter, C., “Regional Arrangements and the United Nations Charter”, in 
rudiGer, W.  (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of  Public International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2009.
3 On the role played by AU in this regard see enGel, U. and Gomes Porto, J. (eds.), Towards 
an African Peace and Security Regime: Continental Embeddedness, Transnational Linkages, Strategic Relevance, 
Ashgate, London  2013 and Hull Wiklund, C. and inGerstAd, I., The Regionalisation of  Peace Operations 
in Africa, Advantages, Challenges and the Way Ahead, FOI, Stockholm, 2015. 
4 See  de Guttry, A., “Recent trends in peacekeeping operations run by regional organizations and 
the resulting interplay with the United Nations system” , African Journal of  Conflict Resolution, Vol. 11, 
No. 3, 2011, p. 27 ff.
5 Boutellis, A. and WilliAms, P. D., Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations. Towards 
more effective Partnerships in Peace Operations, International Peace Institute, New York,  2013.
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that the UN Secretary General (SG) initiate, in full cooperation with AU, a lessons-
learned exercise on the transition from AU to UN operations and provide specific 
recommendations that could be used for future transitional arrangements. The UN 
SG presented his Report to the SC on 5 January 2015:6 this contribution is aimed 
at thoroughly examining and commenting on this report and the recommendations 
contained therein.
II. THE METHODOLOGY ADOPTED TO PREPARE THE REPORT OF THE SG
The lessons-learned exercise, which served as the basis for the Report, was 
driven by the DPKO in collaboration with United Nations Office to the African 
Union, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
Mali (MINUSMA), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the AU, the Economic 
Community of  Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of  
West African States (ECOWAS) and relevant United Nations departments, offices, 
agencies, funds and programs. After a desk review phase aimed at examining all the 
relevant reports, the process included an interview phase with relevant UN and AU 
officials as well with other relevant stakeholders. The preliminary findings emerging 
from these two phases were presented and discussed during a meeting in Cairo, on 
19 November 2014, which was attended by all relevant international and regional 
actors directly involved in the operations in the two countries. Finally a Joint UN-
AU validation meeting took place in Addis Ababa, at the Headquarters of  AU, to 
endorse the findings and the recommendations.
III. THE EVENTS IN MALI AND IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
 WHICH LED TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF AFISMA AND MISCA 
 AND LATER OF MINUMSA AND MINUSCA
The outbreak of  a severe crisis in Mali after the coup d’état that occurred 
in Bamako in March 2012, which caused disturbances, riots, lootings and a very 
confusing situation about the real leadership in the country, induced several regional 
actors (in particular ECOWAS and AU) to make efforts to find a political solution 
in order to restore democracy and to stabilize the country. As the situation was 
6 S/2015/3.
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deteriorating, the UNSC, taking note of  the requests of  several actors involved in the 
country,7 on 20 December 2012 adopted Resolution 2085(2012) which authorized 
the deployment of  an African- led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) 
with a robust mandate.8
In the following Resolution 2100(2013) of   25 April 2013 the SC decided to 
establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
Mali (MINUSMA) to which AFISMA was requested  to transfer  authority as from 1 
July 2013. As a consequence, about 6500 personnel of  AFISMA were re-hatted. The 
mandate conferred upon to MINUSMA was very ambitious and clearly exceeded 
that which was previously attributed to AFISMA.
The events in the CAR were even more complicated. After the civil war broke 
out in December 2012 the country, and in particular the civilian population, faced 
terrible consequences (internally displaced persons, human rights abuses, use of  
child soldiers, rape, torture, extrajudicial killings and forced disappearance)9. As a 
result, a group of  African States10 decided to contribute by sending troops to the 
7 The UNSC Resolution explicitly makes reference to the requests of  the Transitional authorities 
of  Mali dated 18 September 2012, of  the Final communiqué of  the Extraordinary Session of  the 
authority of  ECOWAS Heads of  State and Government held in Abuja on 11 November 2012 and of  
the subsequent communiqué of  the African Union Peace and Security Council (13 November 2012).
8 AFISMA, has been tasked to  take all necessary measures, in compliance with applicable 
international humanitarian law and human rights law and in full respect of  the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and unity of  Mali
(a) To contribute to the rebuilding of  the capacity of  the Malian Defence and Security Forces, in 
close coordination with other international partners involved in this process, including the European 
Union and other Member States; 
(b) To support the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of   its territory under 
the control of  terrorist, extremist and armed groups and in  reducing the threat posed by terrorist 
organizations, including AQIM, MUJWA and  associated extremist groups, while taking appropriate 
measures to reduce the impact  of  military action upon the civilian population; 
(c) To transition to stabilisation activities to support the Malian authorities in  maintaining security 
and consolidate State authority through appropriate capacities; 
(d) To support the Malian authorities in their primary responsibility to  protect the population; 
(e) To support the Malian authorities to create a secure environment for the  civilian-led delivery 
of  humanitarian assistance and the voluntary return of   internally displaced persons and refugees, as 
requested, within its capabilities and in  close coordination with humanitarian actors; 
(f) To protect its personnel, facilities, premises, equipment and mission and to ensure the security 
and movement of  its personnel.
9 For more on this, see Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, Country Report: Central 
African Republic, January 2015 <www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ACLED-
Country-Report_Central-African-Republic.pdf>.
10 Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of  the Congo, Gabon, Republic of  Congo and 
South Africa.
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Economic Community of  Central African States’ to help the government to repel 
the rebels approaching the capital, and to support the work that had been carried 
out since 2008 by the ECCAS Peace Consolidation Mission in the Central African 
Republic (MICOPAX). Considering the difficult situation in the country, the UNSC, 
in response to a request of  the Peace and Security Council of  the AU, authorized 
in Resolution 2127(2013) the deployment of  the African-led International Support 
Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) which was supposed to replace 
MICOPAX. The transfer of  authority took place on 19 December 2013. Taking 
into due account that both AU and ECCAS indicated that MISCA may require 
eventual transformation into a United Nations peacekeeping operation, in the same 
Resolution the SC tasked the SG to undertake expeditiously contingency preparations 
and planning for the possible transformation into a United Nations PKO.11
About 4 months later the SC decided, through Resolution 2149 (2014) of  10 
April 2014, to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). The transfer of  authority 
from MISCA to MINUSCA took place on 15 September 2014. In less than a year, 
the UN transferred the authority of  the mission in CAR first to an African-led 
Operation, and then to MINUSCA. In this case too the mandate given to the UN 
Operation by far exceeded the mandate of  MISCA.
IV. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES  
BETWEEN THE TWO CASES OF MALI AND CAR
The two cases of  Mali and CAR present a few similar features and several 
differences, which deserve to be briefly described as they had an impact on the 
successive transfer of  authority to the UN missions. In both cases there was a clear 
urgency to deploy, in the shortest possible time, a robust international operation to 
prevent any worsening of  the local situation with dramatic consequences for the 
local population. In both cases, due to this feeling of  urgency, the easiest and most 
rapid way to intervene was identified as the deployment of  African-led operations 
with a contribution of  troops mostly from States located in the immediate vicinity 
of  the crisis-affected State. Taking into account the high level of  tension and 
internal disturbances in the two countries, African–led operations were perceived 
as preferable to operations with contingents coming from outside Africa. This was 
11 Paragraphs 46, 47 and 48 of  UNSC Resolution 2173(2013). 
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not only because the African contingents are supposed to have a better knowledge 
of  the military and political scenario in the two countries but also because the local 
population might have been more inclined to accept them. Finally it must also be 
mentioned that there were not many States, beside those who volunteered to send 
troops for the two missions, ready to offer troops for UN operations in Mali or in 
the CAR.12
In both cases the deployment of  the regional force was authorized by the UNSC 
on the basis of  a specific request not only of  the AU institutions and/or sub-
regional organizations (ECCAS and ECOWAS) but also of  the national authorities 
of  the two involved States. The mandate of  the subsequent UN operations clearly 
exceeded that of  the previous regional operation, although both the regional and 
UN operations in Mali and in CAR enjoyed a so called “robust mandate” i.e. they 
were authorized to use any necessary measure (including the use of  force) to carry 
out the task assigned to them.13
Among the differences relevant for the purposes of  this contribution it might 
be worth underlining that in the case of  the CAR, the SC, while authorizing the 
deployment of  MISCA, had already acknowledged that this operation might 
possibly be transformed into a UN PKO and gave clear indications to the SG on 
how to best prepare for this event.14  In the case of  Mali however, UNSC Resolution 
2085(2012) simply requested the SG to establish a multidisciplinary UN presence in 
the country, in order to provide coordinated and coherent support to the on-going 
political and security processes, including assistance with the planning, deployment 
and operations of  AFISMA. In addition to this the SG was requested to actively 
12 In this regard it has to be remembered that there were other actors present in the two countries 
with armed contingents, but within autonomous missions: the French Operations SANGARIS (in 
CAR) and SERVAL (in Mali) and the European Union Military Operation EUFOR RCA in CAR 
established by the Council on 10 February 2014.  See more on EUFOR CAR: <http://eeas.europa.eu/
csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-rca/index_en.htm>.
13 See paragraph 9 of  the UNSC Resolution 2085(2012) and paragraph 17 of  the UNSC Resolution 
2100(2013) concerning respectively AFISMA and MINUSMA and paragraph 28 of  the UNSC 
Resolution 2127(2013) and paragraph 29 of  the UNSC Resolution 2149(2014)   concerning respectively 
MISCA and MINUSCA. 
14 In paragraph 47 of  its Resolution, the SC requested  the Secretary-General “to undertake 
expeditiously contingency  preparations and planning for the possible transformation into a United 
Nations peacekeeping operation,  stressing that a future decision of  this Council would be  required 
to establish such a mission”: Furthermore, in paragraph 48 the SG was instructed  “to report to  the 
Security Council no later than 3 months from the adoption of  this resolution  with recommendations 
on the possible  transformation of  MISCA to a United  Nations peacekeeping operation, including an 
assessment of  progress towards  meeting the appropriate conditions on the ground…”. 
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cooperate, in close coordination with all interested partners and international 
organizations, in the planning and the preparations for the deployment of  AFISMA. 
The highlighted differences in the content of  the two relevant resolutions deserve 
proper attention as they influenced, to a certain extent, the different modalities of  
the transition from an African mission to a fully fledged UN mission.
V. THE MODALITIES OF THE TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY 
 FROM THE AFRICAN-LED OPERATIONS TO THE UN PKOS
The transfer of  authority from AFISMA to MINUSMA was regulated in UNSC 
Resolution 2100(2013). In this Resolution, the SC, after having commended the 
efforts of  all those who contributed to the deployment of  AFISMA, recalled two 
different sets of  documents. First of  all the SC referred to the letter, dated 25 March 
2013, addressed to the SG by the transitional authorities of   Mali, which requested 
the deployment of  a  UN operation to stabilize and restore the authority and the 
sovereignty of  the Malian State throughout its national territory. Furthermore 
the Council made reference to several letters of  regional African organizations 15 
expressing full support for the transformation of  AFISMA into a UN stabilization 
operation in Mali. These two sets of  document played a different role: while the 
first letter of  the Malian transitional authorities constituted the legal basis for the 
deployment of  MINUSMA, the second set of  letters had a higher political value as 
they confirmed the full support of  the regional actors for the deployment of  a UN 
mission replacing the African-led mission.
Taking into account, amongst others, the above mentioned documents, the 
Security Council:
[…] decides to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated  
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), […] requests the Secretary-General to 
subsume the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM) into MINUSMA, with MINUSMA 
assuming responsibility for the discharge of  UNOM’s mandated tasks, as of  the date 
of  adoption of  this resolution, further decides that the authority be  transferred from 
AFISMA to MINUSMA on 1 July 2013 at which point MINUSMA  shall commence 
the implementation of  its mandate […] for an initial period of  12 months and  requests 
15 The SC refers, more precisely to the letter, dated 26 March 2013, addressed to the Secretary-
General by the President of  the ECOWAS Commission, to the communiqué, dated 7 March 2013, of  
the AU Peace and Security Council, as well as to the letter dated 7 March 2013 and addressed to the 
Secretary-General by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security.
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the Secretary-General to include in MINUSMA, in close coordination with the AU 
and ECOWAS, AFISMA  military and police personnel appropriate to United Nations 
standards.
Besides a specific paragraph devoted to the timing of  the phases of  deployment 
on MINUSMA, the SC Resolution contains only one additional operational 
paragraph regulating the transition of  authority from AFISMA to the UN Mission. 
In paragraph 11 of  the Resolution, the Council:
Requests the Secretary-General to appoint expeditiously a Special Representative 
for Mali and Head of  Mission of  MINUSMA, who shall, from the date of  appointment, 
assume overall authority on the ground for the coordination of  all the activities of  the 
United Nations, and its agencies, funds and programmes, in Mali and shall use good 
offices and coordinate efforts of  the international community […] and who shall, 
from the transfer of  authority from AFISMA to  MINUSMA, lead all tasks of  the 
mandate of  MINUSMA as defined in paragraph 16 below, and coordinate the overall 
support of  the international community in Mali,  including in the field of  Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and  Security Sector Reform (SSR), further 
emphasizes that the Special Representative  shall ensure optimal coordination between 
MINUSMA and the United Nations Country Team in Mali, in connection with the 
aspects of  their respective mandates.
The transition from MISCA to MINUSCA was regulated under UNSC Resolution 
2149(2014) which is based, as in the case Resolution 2100(2013) concerning Mali, 
on the request of  the local Government,16 serving as legal justification for the 
deployment and for the political consent of  the AU to such transfer of  authority.17 
The SC decided to establish MINUSCA and requested the Secretary General to 
subsume the presence of  the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in 
the Central African Republic (BINUCA) into MINUSCA as of  the date of  the 
adoption of  the resolution and to ensure a smooth transition from BINUCA to 
MINUSCA. The various temporal phases of  the transition period between MISCA 
and MINUSCA are clearly indicated in the Resolution. The Council, furthermore, 
requested the SG, in close coordination with AU:
to deploy a transition team to set up MINUSCA and prepare the seamless transition 
16 See the letter from the Minister of  Foreign Affairs of  the Central African Republic dated 27 
January 2014 requesting the deployment of  a United Nations peacekeeping operation to stabilize the 
country and address the civilian aspects of  the crisis, quoted in paragraph 35 of  the Preamble of  the 
UNSC Resolution.
17 See para 36 of  the UNSC Resolution.
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of  authority from MISCA to MINUSCA by 15 September 2014 and to take necessary 
steps to prepare and position MISCA, as soon as possible, for its re-hatting to a United 
Nations Peacekeeping operation.
The two Resolutions of  the SC regulating the transitions from the African-led 
operations in Mali and in the CAR to fully fledged UN PKOs present similarities 
and a few interesting differences which can partially be explained considering that 
when adopting Resolution 2149(2014) concerning the CAR, the Council already 
possessed the experience of  and lessons learned from the previous case concerning 
Mali. The most interesting difference consists, undoubtedly, in the more detailed 
rules concerning the transfer of  authority in Resolution 2149(2014). This occurred, 
despite the fact the situation in the two countries (from the perspective of  the 
transfer of  authority) was quite similar and that in both countries there was already a 
significant UN field presence (UNOM in Mali and BINUCA in the CAR).
VI. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE TWO CASE STUDIES
From the perspective of  the effectiveness of  the transitions from African-
led Peace operation to UN PKOs, the two cases presently being examined offer 
interesting opportunities for a lessons-learned exercise. The report of  the SG is very 
timely and useful to support the decision makers at the UN in improving the quality 
of  UNSC Resolutions and the impact, quality and effectiveness of  the political/
operational work carried out by the SG through the personnel deployed in the 
field.  The conclusion can be drawn that a smooth transition from one operation 
to the other can represent a significant contribution to the stability of  the country 
and, therefore, improve the living conditions and the human security of  the local 
population which is (or should be) the main goal of  any PKO.
According to the report by the SG there are six main areas in which lessons 
learnt could play a major role: strategic cooperation on pre- and post-transition, 
operational planning and coordination, command and control, re-hatting modalities, 
civilian capacities and support arrangements. Each of  them deserves to be briefly 
introduced and commented upon.
1. STRATEGIC COOPERATION IN THE PRE- AND POST-TRANSITION PHASE
The first, and perhaps the most important, lesson learnt from the two recent cases 
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is related to the fundamental need to ensure political coherence and harmonization 
of  policies and strategies at the highest level between the institutions involved in the 
transition process. To the extent possible, the mandates given to the two missions 
need to be developed through close cooperation.  As anticipated, the mandate of  
the incoming UN missions, in both cases, has been much wider than the mandate 
attributed to the previous African-led operation: to avoid any inconsistencies which 
might significantly affect the smooth transition process and the full effectiveness 
of  the deployed missions, a close coordination in the definition of  the respective 
mandate is of  essential importance. Various tools and practices are available and 
have been used in the two cases under scrutiny to carry out this cooperation: joint 
assessment of  the operation requirements, joint meetings at political, diplomatic 
and operational level, both at Headquarters and in the field, involving all the 
relevant actors and stakeholders, continuous exchange of  information, harmonized 
recommendations to the respective decision making bodies, creation of  ad-hoc 
task forces within the respective institutions and, finally, the setting up of  specific 
political bodies to provide the necessary political support, coordination  and input 
(for example the Support and Follow-up Group on the Situation in Mali and the 
International Contact Group on the Central African Republic).
As far as the post-transition phase is concerned, the two precedents prove 
the importance of  keeping the relevant regional and sub-regional organizations 
fully involved, even beyond the closing of  their field operations, in order to better 
support and complement the new UN missions. In UNSC Resolution 2149(2014) 
the Council requested AU and ECCAS to support the transition process beyond the 
transfer of  authority on 15 September 2014. We cannot but agree with the words of  
the SG who in his report states that:
The establishment of  strong, post-transition African Union missions, such as 
the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel and the African Union Mission for 
the Central African Republic and Central Africa, contributed to sustaining regional 
engagement and maintaining coherence and unity of  vision at the strategic level. In 
the long term, it could also contribute to facilitating United Nations exit strategies.
In any case the timely indications by the SC of  its intention/willingness to 
transform the regional operation into a UN PKO (as was the case for the CAR), 
undoubtedly represents another instrument which contributes to improving the 
coordination between regional organizations and the UN and to smoothing the 
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transition phase.
To sum up, from the two cases under scrutiny, it clearly emerges that a close 
cooperation between the regional actors and the UN from the very beginning of  
the planning of  a regional mission is of  essential importance to guarantee a smooth 
transition at a later stage. In the interim, once the UN mission replaces the regional 
one, the regional actors should remain closely associated and involved in the country. 
The creation of  ad hoc regional missions, such as those in the CAR and in Mali after 
the transfer of  authority to the UN, proved to be an important tool to guarantee 
continuing political support to the new mission.
2. OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND COORDINATION
The active participation of  dedicated UN staff  in the operational planning of  
a regional mission to be later transferred under the authority of  the UN, represents 
another essential component for a successful transition.18  In both cases UN officers 
working in the field and at Headquarters supported the regional counterparts in the 
challenging process of  mission planning. Although with different timing (in the case 
of  Mali the real cooperation began only after ECOWAS and AU had already started 
to develop distinct concepts of  operations), the participation of  both institutions 
to the operational planning of  the regional mission proved to be decisive. The UN 
staff  provided mainly “technical and expert advice to support the planning and 
deployment of  MISCA and strengthen its command and control, administrative 
infrastructure and training capacity”19 though specific support teams were tasked 
not only to assist the regional actors in planning their activities but also later in 
preparing the subsequent smooth transfer of  authority to the UN missions.
3. COMMAND AND CONTROL
“Clear command and control structures are critical to the success of  
peacekeeping operations, particularly as they operate in volatile political and security 
18 The Report of  the UNGA Special Committee on PKOs of  March 2014 (A/68/19) recognized 
“the growing importance of  partnership and cooperation between the United Nations and regional 
arrangements in planning and conducting United Nations peacekeeping operations. The Special 
Committee encourages the Secretariat to continue developing exercise and training policies with these 
regional arrangements aimed at improving interoperability”: See also WiHArtA, S., “Planning and 
deploying peace operations”, SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 
2008, p.97 ff.
19 Report of  the SG (see n.5 above), p.5.
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environments”.20  This clear cut statement of  the SG reflects a widely agreed 
concept. Unfortunately, its implementation has not been consistent, especially in 
the African continent. The challenges in this regard proved to be complex due to 
a lack of  resources which made communication between force headquarters and 
those deployed in the field difficult and problematic. In Mali, the short transition 
time did not allow the issue to be approached in a proper manner (with negative 
consequences on the process itself). In contrast, in the CAR the attention devoted to 
it was much higher: well before the effective transfer of  authority, a common Joint 
Operations Centre between the African Union and the UN had been established for 
this purpose. This Centre proved to be an essential component of  the transitioning 
strategy, which was carried out in a complex framework in which other missions 
in the country, such as operations Sangaris (carried out by France) and the EU-led 
EUFOR RCA had inevitably to be fully involved in the entire transition exercise.
Well defined mandates of  the different actors in the field, a clear chain of  
command amongst them, fully coordinated activities and the establishment of  a 
Joint Operations Center to manage the transition phase are, from the lessons-learned 
exercise in the two African countries, clearly important aspects of  a transition 
strategy and machinery.
4. RE-HATTING MODALITIES
In most of  the cases in which a transfer of  authority from one mission to the 
other occurs, the military and police components of  the previous mission are, to a 
large extent, re-hatted and join the subsequent mission. The re-hatting phenomenon 
in PK and in PB operations is quite common and the number of  personnel involved 
is very significant.21
Notwithstanding the dimensions of  the problem and the way it has affected 
(very often negatively) the transition phase from a regional actor to the UN, the 
problems which have been experienced in the past have not yet been overcome. 
The general quality and level of  preparation of  the contingents, their equipment, the 
command and control structures, and the human rights record are often below the 
requested UN standards. These deficiencies have had an immediate impact on the 
quality, efficiency and rapidity of  the deployment of  the subsequent UN Mission. 
20 Ibid.
21 soeters J. and mAniGArt, P. (eds.), Military Cooperation in Multinational Peace operations. Managing 
Cultural Diversity and Crisis Response, Routledge, Oxon and New York, 2008.
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The two cases under examination here suffered the same problems notwithstanding 
the concession of  period of  grace, the organization of  additional training activities 
and efforts to upgrade the equipment. The duty-of- care the UN faces towards their 
staff  on one hand and the human rights due diligence policy (which requires the UN 
not to deploy anyone who has been involved in violations of  international human 
rights or humanitarian law) have been seriously compromised.
Even taking into due account the pressure on the UN to promptly deploy and 
implement the mandate these shortcomings should by carefully considered and 
specific strategies to overcome them should be elaborated even in the preliminary 
stage of  mission-planning. In any case there are no quick and easy solutions to these 
challenges: as underlined in the SG Report, Member States and international donors 
must increasingly support the capacity of  African States to deliver troops equipped, 
trained and screened according to the UN standards.22 The generous contributions 
of  the EU to support the African Peace and Security Architecture (and to finance 
several AU-led Peace Support Operations) as well as that of  many States acting on 
a bilateral basis23 are positive steps but much more has to be done. Furthermore a 
closer relationship in the planning phase between the regional deploying organization 
and the UN could also contribute to ensuring that the troops selected to operate 
in a regional PKO have the same standards as required by the UN: this would 
simplify the transition and re-hatting phase significantly. Finally and in line with 
the increased attention to the accountability of  the UN, special attention must be 
devoted to ensuring that the UN human rights screening policy is fully implemented 
and respected, without exception. Once more, increased cooperation between the 
regional actors and the UN at the preliminary phase of  the planning of  a regional 
PKO could ensure that the required human rights standards are incorporated into 
the selection process of  the regional PK forces. This would have a very positive 
impact on the credibility and accountability of  the UN and of  the regional deploying 
institutions.
5. CIVILIAN CAPACITIES
The civilian mandate of  most of  the recent UN PKOs has significantly increased 
22 Report of  the SG (see n.5 above), p.7.
23 As an example it might be worth quoting the significant work carried out by the Center of  
Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) of  the Italian Carabinieri, located in Vicenza, where 
hundreds of  African peace-keepers have been trained.
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and become more substantial, more complex and more demanding. To fulfill these 
new tasks there is a need to find properly trained, skilled and motivated personnel, 
able to work in a challenging environment and to interact with the military and police 
components. The UN and some regional organizations involved in the delivery 
of  PKOs (and in primis, the EU) have given the necessary priority to identifying, 
recruiting and training the right personnel. The creation of  rosters with restricted 
and conditional access, the organization of  training activities and the pre-selection 
of  potential candidates ready to be mobilized, are only part of  the strategy to equip 
the UN and other regional organizations with well trained and qualified staff. At 
African level similar efforts have been recently initiated, although the results are not 
yet entirely satisfactory. According to Article 13 of  the Peace and Security Council 
(PSC) Protocol, the African Standby Force (ASF) shall be composed of  multi-
disciplinary civilian and military components held on standby in their countries 
of  origin, and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. The Protocol 
states, furthermore, that the AU should establish and centrally manage a roster of  
“mission administration and civilian experts to handle human rights, humanitarian, 
governance, reconstruction and DDR functions in future missions”. In 2006 a 
Technical Experts Workshop on the Civilian Dimension of  the ASF took place in 
Ghana and adopted a detailed document on “The Policy Framework for the Civilian 
Dimension of  the ASF”.24 Two years later, an “African Union ASF staffing, training 
and rostering workshop” took place in 2008 in Uganda and recommended that each 
regional capacity should be prepared to deploy approximately 60 civilians. To this end 
a civilian standby roster of  approximately 300 civilian specialists should be developed 
in each sub-region.25 The African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and 
Regional Mechanisms (RM) recently launched an ambitious training and rostering 
process which has significantly improved the overall situation. Notwithstanding all 
these efforts,26 there are still many deficiencies that need to be overcome. Not only 
is the quantity/quality of  the civilians involved in PKOs a problem in the African 
continent, but the precise definition of  the civilian mandate remains problematic, as 
well as the reporting methodology. The latter causes discrepancies with the risk of  
24 The meeting of  the African Ministers of  Defence and Security of  March 2008 considered and 
took note of  this document.
25 The report was subsequently noted and acted upon at the 6th Meeting of  African Chiefs of  
Defence Staff  and Heads of  Safety and Security of  May 2009.
26 For more on this see  de ConinG, C.  and kAsumBA, Y. (eds.), The Civilian Dimension of  the African 
Standby Force, ACCORD, Johannesburg, 2010.
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rendering previous reports unusable by the succeeding organization, with a serious 
impact on the credibility of  the missions and very often an increase in impunity for 
human rights violations.
Most of  these problems are dealt with in the Report of  the SG although his 
proposals about how to overcome these deficiencies seem insufficient, considering 
the importance of  the issue. The SG merely suggests a more systematic coordination 
between the two organizations combined with enhanced civilian capacity to 
implement strategies related specifically to the protection of  civilians. Much more 
could and should be done: the organization of  joint training activities between UN 
and African civilian staff  on essential issues (such as monitoring and reporting), a 
better definition by the UN of  their reporting standards and a coordinated effort to 
harmonize within UN and AU the methodology on following up on human rights 
violations and on the modalities of  sharing info in this regard. This last aspect seems 
to be crucial to make sure that investigations and follow up on violations of  human 
rights proceed smoothly and without being affected by the transition from one 
organization to the other. These innovations must happen soon in order to ensure 
the respect which is due to the victims of  human rights abuses.
6. SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS
Extraordinary efforts have been carried out in recent years by the AU as well 
as by the RECs and the RM to be ready to deploy on short notice and to have all 
the necessary material available for use. In the meantime generous contributions 
of  many regional organizations and member States have facilitated the capacity of  
the AU to deliver timely field operations. This notwithstanding, there is a persistent 
need to overcome the limited ability, so far, of  the AU to secure adequate support 
in the conduct of  its peace operations. The UNSC Resolutions authorizing the 
deployment of  MISCA and of  AFISMA requested the SG to provide soft support 
to these missions.  To fulfill this demand the SG deployed additional UN experts to 
support MISCA in the areas of  mission support, communication and military and 
police planning.  The UN support to AFISMA and MISCA has also materialized 
through another instrument: the creation of  trust funds, in order to supplement the 
resource mobilization carried out by AU. The SC in both Resolutions 2085(2012) 
and 2127 (2013) formally tasked the SG to establish these funds: the result was 
far beyond expectations. The funds received for the mission in Mali amounted to 
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$44 million while for the mission in CAR the funds received were only $5 million. 
Although a few member States, and especially the USA and France, were generous 
in providing bilateral support directly to a number of  troop or police-contributing 
States, the donor conference for MISCA which was organized by AU in Addis 
Ababa, confirmed the limited generosity in feeding the trust funds. Further, the 
conditionality which was attached to the funding (in most cases the funds disbursed 
by Member States were earmarked for non-lethal assistance) rendered these funds 
unable to be spent supporting the field operations and later on the smooth transition. 
As stressed in UNSC Resolution 2167 (2014), there is an urgent priority to enhance 
the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of  financing regional organizations 
when they undertake peacekeeping under a SC mandate.
To be effective the transfer of  authority must happen between an already 
well-functioning mission and another which will build on and benefit from the 
experiences and the results achieved by the previous operation.  In both cases the 
constraints faced by the AU in the delivery of  field operations should have suggested 
an increase in the financial and logistical support to AU. This would have contributed 
to increasing the impact of  the mission itself, facilitating a smooth transition process 
and allowing the benefits and the added value of  regional organizations deploying a 
field operation in a member State to be fully realised. This represents, undoubtedly, 
an important lesson learnt.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Peacekeeping Operations have become very popular in recent decades and they 
have attracted the interest of  several actors who promoted themselves, for different 
reasons, as potential deliverers of  these field missions. Regional and sub-regional 
organizations have been very active in this regard and most of  them have initiated 
ambitious programs and activities to be ready to deliver in an efficient manner 
these more and more demanding and complex operations. Considering the political 
situation in many African countries and the legacy of  history, and taking into 
account that most of  these operations are deployed in the African continent, it does 
not come as a surprise that regional institutions in Africa have been at the forefront 
in building up their capacity to deliver PKOs. The development of  the African 
Peace and Security Architecture as well as the ASF are positive initiatives, which 
deserve the necessary political and technical support. The contribution of  many 
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States and partners in terms of  financial support and in kind donations have thus far 
proved to be fundamental, yet still not enough. The need to develop new synergies 
and forms of  cooperation between regional and UN operations has become of  
pivotal importance and recently many new ideas/models of  partnership have been 
experimented with: from the mere logistical/financial support offered by the UN 
to regional organizations to the authorization by the SC to a Regional organization 
to deliver a PKO, 27 or even the joint delivery of  a field operation (such as in the 
case of  UNAMID).28 One of  these models, which is gaining momentum, consists 
in initiating a PKO by the competent regional organization and then to transfer the 
authority, after a given period, to the UN. This model, mostly used in Africa, has 
many positive aspects but also poses several challenges, most of  them being related 
to the constraints the AU is facing.
In any case, in addition to the numerous goodwill statements and political 
declarations concerning the need to reinforce the mutual cooperation between 
the UN and AU, several concrete actions have been already undertaken.  At least 
three deserve special mention due to their far-reaching impact and relevance for 
the transition from an AU-led to a UN PKO: the creation of  the African Union 
Peacekeeping Support Team within the Department of  Peacekeeping Operations 
and the establishment of  the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) 
as coordinating structures, aimed at providing necessary expertise and transfer of  
technical  knowledge to enhance the capacity of  the African Union’s Peace Support 
Operations Division, including in mission planning and management. The third 
element which could further contribute to definitively improve the transition phase 
is associated with the setting of  benchmarks (agreed upon by both the regional 
deploying organization and the UN) on when it might be appropriate to deploy a 
UN PKO. This specific activity would tremendously impact on the quality of  the 
planning, it would provide greater clarity on the timelines and conditions under 
which transitions take place and, therefore, increase their predictability, and would 
demonstrate unity of  strategic vision between the two actors involved in the present 
27 For more on the challenges related to this model see GILL T.D., “Legal Aspects of  the Transfer 
of  Authority in UN Peace Operations”’, in  DEKKER  I.F.  and  HEY E. (eds.), Netherlands Yearbook of  
International Law, 2011, p.32 and BELLAMY A.J. and  WILLIAMS P.D (eds.), Providing Peacekeepers. The 
Politics, Challenges and Future on United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2013, at p.437 ff.
28 For more on this see  GELOT L., Peace Operations and Global Regional Security: The African Union-
United Nations Partnership in Darfur, Routledge,  Oxon and New York, 2012.
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and future operations. The interesting benchmarking exercise, strongly encouraged 
by UNSC Resolution 2093(2013), concerning Somalia and implemented jointly by 
the AU and the UN, provides enough evidence of  the potential positive impact of  
this instrument.29
The lessons-learned exercise initiated, upon request of  the SC, by the UNSG 
with specific reference to the transfer of  authority of  the missions in Mali and in 
the CAR, proved to be useful and relevant as it has been conducted in a sound 
and transparent manner which allows the shortcomings and strengths of  both 
actors involved to be highlighted and proposes a few realistic suggestions and 
recommendations to be taken into account for future missions.
The methodology used to prepare the report seems adequate to the specific 
needs at stake although a more active role of  the real beneficiaries of  the two 
operations, namely the two States directly involved, Mali and the CAR, as well of  
representatives of  the civil society of  the two countries would have been beneficial 
to increase the diversification of  the sources of  information on which the Report is 
based and therefore the credibility of  the Report itself.
The problematic issues associated with the two cases have been carefully 
addressed in the previous paragraph: the next challenge is now to make sure that 
the SC (and other UN institutions) and the AU competent bodies make good 
use of  this exercise. This is crucial for increasing integration, interoperability and 
effective mission mandate implementation, avoiding unnecessary overlapping while 
searching for all possible synergies and cooperation; developing the capacity of  the 
staff  to work together with members of  other International Institutions working 
in the same country; contributing to create some common and inter-institutional 
culture among the different components of  crisis management operations. The 
long-awaited transfer of  authority from AMISOM to a UN PKO could be the next 
case which might benefit from this lessons-learned exercise. 30This would be already 
a great contribution of  the report of  the SG, especially considering the broader 
framework of  Chapter VIII of  the UN Charter that not only requests States to 
29 For more information on this case see the Report of  the Chairperson of  the Commission on the 
Joint AU-UN Benchmarking Exercise and the Review of  the African Union Mission in Somalia, PSC/
PR/2. (CCCXCIX)  < www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-rpt-399-amisom-09-10-2013.pdf>.
30 See the interesting article by  FreeAr, M.  and  de ConinG, C., “Lessons from the African Union 
Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for Peace Operations in Mali”, Stability, International Journal of  Security 
& Development, Vol. 2(2), 2013,  p. 11 ff: the two authors investigate the extent to which the AMISOM 
experience influenced the operations in Mali. 
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make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement of  local disputes through regional 
arrangements before referring them to the Security Council but also reiterates that: 
The Security Council shall encourage the development of  pacific settlement 
of  local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies 
either on the initiative of  the states concerned or by reference from the Security 
Council.
Very much in line with this article, UNSC Resolution 2167 (2014) which was 
adopted at the conclusion of  the open debate on “Peacekeeping Operations: The 
United Nations and Regional Partnerships and its evolution” which took place in 
New York at the end of  July 2014, welcomed: 
the continuing efforts and enhanced peacekeeping role of  regional  and subregional 
organizations, consistent with the Charter of  the United Nations and Security Council 
resolutions and decisions, including in preparing the ground for United Nations 
peacekeeping operations and calling upon regional and subregional organizations to 
promote coherence and coordination of  their peacekeeping efforts with those of  the 
peacekeeping operations and special political missions, as well as  with the wider United 
Nations presence on the ground.
The experiences of  the two cases in Mali and in the CAR  prove that the 
growing contribution made by regional and subregional organizations can usefully 
complement the work of  the UN in maintaining international peace and security: 
what is needed now is for everyone involved, from the UN to the regional actors, 
from the member States to other IOs, to play their respective roles as requested in 
various UNSC Resolutions to consolidate this mutual cooperation and transform 
it into a winning strategy. This would be the best contribution of  the international 
community as a whole to improve the human security of  the local population of  
countries emerging from conflicts or from other disasters. 
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